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I. INTRODUCTION
N restructured power systems, ISOs/RTOs coordinate competitive market participants for ensuring secure system operation and economic market operation. Such operation decisions are usually made via optimization approaches, such as unit commitment (UC) and ED problems. This paper focuses on the ED problem, which determines the least-cost operation of power systems by dispatching generation resources to supply system loads, while satisfying prevailing system-level and unit constraints.
Emerging smart grid techniques have been promoting the increasing participation of new entities into power markets, including smalls-scale renewable/gas-fired generation owners, prosumers equipped with self-owned generation resources, and active customers with demand response capabilities. For instance, NYISO allows various entities to participate in its energy, ancillary service, and demand response markets with the minimum asset size of 1MW [1] . The participation of small-scale entities would significantly increase the volume of data and the scale of optimization models, which boosts the request on high-performance efficient computing architectures. In turn, ISOs/RTOs have been looking into the solution of cloud computing technology for solving their ever increasing operation problems [2] . However, such optimization models always contain critical energy infrastructure information and private financial information of individual market participants,
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Under the restructured power market environment, in order to solve the ED problem, detailed information of individual market participants needs to be collected by the ISO/RTO for the centralized optimization. These market participants are distributed in the system and tend to autonomously maximize their own profits. They share system-level global constraints as well as local constraints that refer to its private limitations or capacities, and serious privacy problems may arise if such information is revealed. Although ISOs/RTOs are neutral and have strict policies regarding the release of such information, there are at least two potential ways that may lead to information leakage: cyberattack and other strategic ways to derive such information. Smart grid technology makes the system even more vulnerable, and attackers could gain access to critical data streams via either hacking into the communication infrastructure, ISOs/RTOs' database, or the cloud. Another way is that a strategic market participant may be able to identifying its rival producers' offer prices with limited available information. This in turn would result in great loss of possible confidential information leakage. For instance, [3] adopted the inverse optimization to reveal price offers of rival producers, with the assumption that accepted generation/ demand blocks for producers/consumers and LMPs are known.
Over the past few years, various schemes have been explored for solving ED problems in a distributed fashion, which does not require a subsystem to disclose its confidential financial information to other subsystems or ISOs/RTOs. Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) was used in [4] - [6] to relax coupling constraints among different subsystems and allow subproblems to be solved separately. Auxiliary problem principle (APP) was applied on the distributed optimal power flow problem [7] - [8] , which solves a sequence of auxiliary problems involving the augmented LR. Alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) was also utilized for solving distributed convex power system optimization problems [9] . Another important method applied to distributed optimization is the consensus algorithm. Distributed ED approach based on the incremental cost (IC) consensus was discussed in [10] - [11] .
Inspired by [12] - [13] , different from distributed optimization, this paper proposes a privacy-preserving ED approach which is still a centralized problem solved by ISOs/RTOs. Individual market participants can mask their actual bidding information and physical data by multiplying with random numbers before submitting to ISOs/RTOs. It also allows the ISO to encrypt the physical transmission network information, which makes it possible to rely on cloud computing service providers for performing critical and time-consuming power system optimization tasks while not worry about critical information leakage. In addition, the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach can retrieve the optimal solution to the original ED problem, including optimal dispatches of generators/loads and LMPs. This allows ISOs to continue performing market operation functionalities. Numerical case studies validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for protecting private information while guaranteeing the same optimal ED solution. Computation and communication costs of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach and the original ED are also compared in case studies to demonstrate the scalability of the proposed approach. Although this paper focuses on the ED problem for a single ISO/RTO, the proposed approach can also be applied for solving multi-area coordinated ED problems for multiple interconnected ISOs/RTOs [14] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the proposed privacy preserving ED problem approach. Numerical case studies are presented in Section III, and Section IV summarizes conclusions.
II. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ED APPROACH

A. Original ED Problem
The original ED problem is formulated as (1)- (6) . The objective (1) is to maximize the social welfare. (6) .
In order to solve the ED problem (1)-(6) in a centralized way, all information from GENCOs and LSEs are to be sent to the ISO/RTO. Such information includes bidding price and physical parameters , ̅ , , and of individual generators, as well as bidding price and physical parameters and ̅ of individual loads. Transmitting such information to ISOs/RTOs and storing them at the ISO/RTO side may be risky to information leakage. Moreover, if the ISO adopts could computing for the ED problem, additional security concerns regarding the critical energy infrastructure information leakage, including , ̅̅̅̅ , and , may raise.
B. Privacy-Preserving Linear Programming (LP) Problem
Two privacy-preserving transformation approaches for the LP problem have been investigated in literature [15] - [16] , in which certain information owned by individual entities is encrypted via the random matrix transformation before being disclosed. After solving the transformed LP problem, each entity can decode the corresponding solution components and derive the exact solution of the original LP problem. Without loss of generality, the LP problem (7)- (8) is used for the ease of discussion in this subsection. Assuming that boundaries of variables are included in the constraint set (8) .
[ 11 12 With the encrypted information, the original LP problem (7)- (8) is formulated as a transformed LP problem (9)-(10). 
Comparing (7)- (8) with (9)- (10), it is clear that the extrema are equal. In addition, with the optimal solution [̃1 1 ̃1 2 ̃2 1 ̃2 2 ̃3 1 ̃3 2 ] of the transformed LP problem (9)-(10), the optimal solution to the original problem (7)- (8) 
B.2 Horizontally Partitioned LP Problem
For the LP problem (7)- (8) First, by enlarging the dimension of variables with additional slack variables 1 , 2 , and 3 , Entities I-III can equivalently transfer their corresponding inequality constraints into equalities. Thus, the original LP problem (7)- (8) is transformed into an equivalent LP problem (11) ] for = 1,2,3.
Thus, instead of disclosing 11 -14 and 11 -12 , Entity I will 
1 , 2 , 3 ≥ 0 (16) Comparing (7)- (8) with (14)- (16), it is clear that the extrema are equal, and the optimal solution to the original LP problem (7)- (8) is the same as that of transformed problem (14)- (16) .
C. Privacy Preserving ED Problem
The ED problem (1)- (6) can be written in the matrix form (17)-(19).
[
In the ED problem (17)- (19), each GENCO i owns , , , and with decision variables , each LSE j owns , , , and with decision variables , and the ISO owns ( • ), , and ̅̅̅̅ with decision variables . Thus, the hybrid vertical and horizontal partition is applied to achieve the privacy-preserving ED model. (17)-(19). That is, cost coefficients and left-hand-side coefficients of all constraints are encrypted via random numbers privately owned by individual entities.
1: Apply the Vertical Partition on the Original ED Problem (17)-(19).
Each GENCO i provides its encrypted matrices
max [(− 1 • 1 ) ⋯ (− • ) ( 1 • 1 ) ⋯ ( • ) ] • [̃1 ⋯ ̃ ̃1 ⋯ ̃ ̃] ′ (20) [ 1 • 1 ⋯ ⋯ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋯ • ⋯ ⋯ 1 • 1 ⋯ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋯ ⋯ • ⋯ ⋯ • • ⋯ ⋯ − • • ] • [ ̃1 ⋮ 1 ⋮̃] ≤ [ 1 ⋮ 1 ⋮ ̅̅̅̅ ̅̅̅̅ ](21)[( 1 • 1 ) ⋯ ( • ) −( 1 • 1 ) ⋯ −( • ) − • ] • [̃1 ⋯̃̃1 ⋯̃̃]′ =(22)
2: Apply the Horizontal Partition on the Transformed ED Problem (20)-(22).
2.1 Each GENCO i introduces slack variables ̃ to convert its inequality constraints into equality, then provides its encrypted matrices ( . That is, coefficients and right-hand-sides of all constraints are further encrypted via random numbers. Note that when converting an inequality constraint into equality, adding a non-negative slack variable or the product of a positive random number and the non-negative slack variable are mathematically equivalent. Thus, , , 1 , and 2 are used to further encrypt each constraint set. The detailed procedure of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach is described as follows:
• •
Step 1: Each GENCO i provides its encrypted matrices Step 2: The ISO provides its encrypted matrices ( Step 3: The ISO or the third-party solves the transformed privacy-preserving ED problem (23) Step 4: The corresponding optimal solution to the transformed privacy-preserving ED problem (23)- (25) is sent back to individual GENCOs and LSEs to reconstruct the optimal solution to the original ED problem. That is, each GENCO i can obtain its optimal generation dispatch * = •̃ * ; each LSE j can calculate its optimal load dispatch * = •̃ * ; and the ISO can derive the optimal bus angle * = •̃ * and the final LMP * = − ′ •̃ * .
In sum, the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach allows individual GENCOs and LSEs to mask their actual bidding information and physical data by multiplying with random numbers before submitting to ISOs/RTOs. This could avoid potential information leakage on financial data of market participants. In addition, the ISO can encrypt physical information on the transmission network topology, which would avoid potential information leakage on critical energy infrastructure, especially when the optimization problem is deployed under cloud computing environments. In the next section, numerical case studies will validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, along with detailed analyses on its computation and communication costs.
III. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT
The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach is tested on a 3-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system to evaluate its effectiveness on encrypting critical energy infrastructure information and financial data of market participants while being able to reconstruct the optimal solution to the original ED problem.
A. 3-Bus System
A 3-bus system is studied for a single hour, which includes 2 generators, 1 load, and 3 branches. Generator and load data, including their three-segment bidding information, are given in Table I . Transmission line data are given in Table II. U1 belongs to GENCO1, GENCO2 owns U2, and LSE1 serves load L1. The single hour ED problem is formulated as (26), with bus 1 as the reference bus. The optimal solution of (26) The proposed privacy-preserving ED formulation corresponding to (23)- (25) is shown in (27)-(28). Six slack variables are introduced to each GENCO/LSE for converting inequalities constraints into equalities, and six slack variables are introduced to convert power flow inequality constraints into equalities. The optimal solutions to (27)- (28) 
In order to perform the original ED calculation (26), each market participant has to submit its actual financial bidding prices and physical information to the ISO. For instance, GENCO1 will submit its three-segment bidding prices 10$/MWh, 15$/MWh, and 18 $/MWh, together with the three-segment dispatch ranges [10, 90] 
encrypt its actual financial bidding prices and dispatch ranges from being released. Furthermore, it is impossible for other entities or third-parties to reveal actual values of 1 and 1 with public information on (32)-(37). The IEEE 118-bus system is further tested for 24 hours while considering all prevailing ED constraints discussed in Section II, for illustrating the effectiveness of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach for larger systems. The system includes 54 generating units and 91 loads. The following 5 cases are studied:
The original ED, in which all entities provide their actual information.
Case 1:
The proposed privacy-preserving ED, in which each GENCO/LSE owns only one generator/load.
Cases 2-4:
The proposed privacy-preserving ED, in which each GENCO/LSE owns 2, 5, and 10 generators/loads, respectively. These three cases will illustrate how different sizes of GENCOs/LSEs may impact computation and communication costs of the proposed privacy-preserving ED. Table III shows problem scales and computational performances of all 5 cases. All cases derive the same optimal solution of $2.0221*10 6 . The proposed privacy-preserving ED models in Cases 1-4 do not increase the total number of constraints as compared to Case 0, although inequality constraints in Case 0 are converted into equality constraints with additional slack variables in Cases 1-4. In turn, numbers of variables in Cases 1-4 are much higher than that of Case 0. In addition, constraint coefficient matrices in Cases 1-4 are much denser than that of Case 0. Furthermore, the larger the number of generators/loads each entity owns, the higher the density of the constraint coefficient matrix is. The computational performance in the last column of Table III shows that computing times of Cases 1-4 are at the similar level, which is about 12 to 16 times higher than that of Case 0. As the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach in Cases 1-4 evolves generating random matrices for encrypting financial and physical information, multiple instances of Case 4 are performed to illustrate how random matrices may impact the computational performance. Fig. 1 shows computational times of 100 instances of Case 4. The shortest and the longest computing times among the 100 instances are 6.375 seconds and 13.406 seconds, respectively. The mean computing time of the 100 instances is 8.639 seconds, with the standard deviation of 1.562 seconds. It shows that the computing time is impacted by random matrices, while the computational performance may range from 10 to 20 times higher than that of Case 0.
The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach, by submitting encrypted matrices instead of actual financial and physical information, may also increase the communication cost. Table IV shows communication requirements of the 5 cases. In comparison, information exchange between entities and the ISO in Cases 1-4 is much higher than that of Case 0, and is more significant with a larger number of generators/loads owned by each entity. For instance, in Case 0, the number of data sent from all entities to ISO (including bidding prices and physical limitations) is 24,216, and the number of data sent from ISO to all entities (including market clear quantities and LMPs) is 11,496. On the other hand, in Case 1, the number of data sent from all entities to ISO is increased to 232,536, which is about 8.6 times higher than that of Case 0. The last two columns of Table IV show the size of exchanged data in all 5 cases. Fortunately, with a typical 10 Mbps bandwidth communication infrastructure [17] between market participants and the ISO, all these communication tasks can be done within seconds. In sum, the following observations can be made from the above case studies:
1) The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach can retrieve the same optimal solution as the original ED approach, while avoiding disclosing actual bidding information and physical data.
2) For a same system, when a large number of generators/loads is owned by a single entity rather than multiple entities, the computational time does not increase noticeably while the communication cost would significantly increase.
3) Although the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach requires more computational time and a higher communication cost as compared to the original ED model, it is still tolerable under the current electricity market practice (i.e., less than 10 seconds for solving the privacy-preserving ED problem and a couple of seconds for the communication).
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper privacy-preserving ED approach in competitive electricity market, in which individual GENCOs and LSEs can mask their actual bidding information and physical data by multiplying with random numbers before submitting to ISOs/ RTOs. This would avoid potential information leakage of potential financial data of market participants. In addition, the ISO can encrypt physical information on the transmission network topology, which would avoid potential information leakage on critical energy infrastructure, especially when the optimization problem is deployed under cloud computing environments. The transformed privacy-preserving ED model is still an LP problem, with the same number of total constraints and a larger number of variables as compared to the original ED problem. The optimal solution to the original ED problem can be retrieved from the optimal solution of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach. Numerical case studies show that although computation and communication costs of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach are higher than the original ED, it is still tolerable under the current electricity market practice. The future work will investigate the application of the proposed approach on other power systems optimization problems such as unit commitment and long-term investment planning.
